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R61Consciousness: Reading the Neural
SignatureThe brain is the seat of consciousness yet we are unaware of much of our own
neural processing. What differentiates conscious and unconscious processes?
A new study suggests the answer might lie in the reproducibility of patterns of
neural activation.Within category
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Figure 1. Neural correlates of consciousness.
A red-green line drawing can be made invisible by reversing foreground and background
colours between the two eyes [4,5], in which case subjects perceive a uniform yellow square.
Schurger et al. [4] identified a posterior region of the temporal lobe in which the pattern of acti-
vation could be used to categorize whether an invisible line-drawing was a face or a house.
Categorization failed when the drawings were visible, even though the patterns of activation
were more reproducible.Colin W.G. Clifford
The question of how mind emerges
from matter has exercised
philosophers since antiquity.
Innovative studies are now using
functional brain imaging to provide new
insights into the relationship between
neural processes and conscious
experience [1]. Such work is finding
clinical application in terms of
predicting recovery from vegetative
state following coma [2,3].
A recent paper [4] claims to have
identified a characteristic neural
signature of conscious processing.
Schurger and colleagues [4] used
functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to study patterns of
activation in the temporal lobes of
subjects presented with line drawings
of faces or houses presented in red and
green (Figure 1). A prism arrangement
presented the same image to the two
eyes with the foreground and
background colours either the same
or reversed. In the reversed condition
the colours appeared to fuse [5], so
that the line drawings were invisible
and subjects perceived a uniform
yellow square.
Using multivariate pattern analysis of
the fMRI data [1,6], the experimenters
found that different regions of the
temporal lobe were best able to
discriminate face from house stimuli.
Specifically, the region whose pattern
of activation was most informative
about the category (face or house) of
the invisible stimuli was anatomically
more posterior than the region most
informative about the visible stimuli.
The key finding was that the pattern
of activation in the more posterior
region showed less trial-to-trial
variability for visible than invisible
stimuli from a given category. In other
words, the response to a consciously
perceived face (or house) tended to
be more reproducible than for the
corresponding invisible stimulus.
On the basis of this finding, Schurger
et al. [4] suggest that reproducibilitymight prove to be a general criterion
by which conscious neural processes
can be characterized. This is a bold
conjecture which could have important
implications for mechanistic theories
of consciousness [7,8]. For example, in
a dynamical neural system those states
which are more stable might show
greater trial-to-trial reproducibility.
Consciousness might then be
associated with those more stable
states.
Surprisingly, the ability of the
posterior region of the temporal lobe
to categorize invisible faces and
houses did not generalize to the
visible condition. It is thus important
to consider whether any factors other
than visibility might affect categorical
discrimination of the face and house
images. One obvious difference is that
chromatic conflict between the two
eyes’ images is present only in the
invisible condition. The posterior
region able to discriminate invisible
stimuli was located along the posterior
fusiform gyrus, which forms the border
of area hV4 in ventral occipital cortex
[9]. Areas of the ventral visual pathway
are known to be highly responsive to
colour [10], and hV4 in particular has
previously been shown to respond toinvisible chromatic modulation [11].
Thus, it might not be invisibility per se
but rather the mechanism of colour
fusion used to achieve invisibility that
accounts for the processing
differences between visible and
invisible stimuli.
In a predictive coding framework
[12,13], activity at lower levels of
the processing hierarchy is influenced
by the ability of higher-level
representations to ‘explain away’
the pattern of activity at lower levels.
In the current context, feedback
from higher-level representations in
the visible condition might explain
away some of the variability between
the responses to stimuli within
a category — for example, the various
face stimuli used — resulting in more
reproducible patterns of activation at
the lower levels of processing. Whether
such higher-level representations
would need to be conscious is not
clear. Even if a role for consciousness
could be demonstrated behaviourally,
the reproducibility of low-level
processing would not establish that the
low-level processes themselves were
conscious, only that they were
receiving feedback from higher-level
representations. Thus, reproducibility
would be evidence of conscious
processing somewhere in the brain
but not necessarily at the locations
where reproducible patterns of
activation were observed.
In summary, the proposal that
reproducibility provides a neural
signature for conscious processing is
certainly tantalizing; however, future
work is required to establish whether
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R62the key finding on which the proposal is
based generalizes over stimulus sets
and methods of achieving invisibility. If
reproducibility does generally correlate
with consciousness, then this could
provide a useful diagnostic criterion.
The hard problem will then be to
demonstrate a causal, mechanistic link
between the reproducibility of a neural
process and its role in consciousness.References
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Convergence in Echolocating
MammalsThe motor protein prestin confers sensitive and selective hearing in mammals.
Remarkably, prestin amino-acid sequences of echolocating dolphins have
converged to resemble those of distantly related echolocating bats.Gareth Jones
Appearances can deceive. Biologists
are very familiar with examples of
morphological characters that
converge independently in response to
similar selective pressures, resulting in
the evolution of organisms that are very
alike in appearance, despite having
different ancestry. Such convergent
evolution can then confound the
reconstruction of evolutionary history.
For example, the hedgehog tenrecs of
Madagascar were long believed to be
close relatives of ‘true’ hedgehogs, and
were placed alongside them in the
mammalian order Insectivora because
of their extensive morphological
similarities, including the possession
of spines. Recent and extensive
gene sequencing studies have
produced a stable tree topology for
the higher-level phylogeny of placental
mammals, and the tenrecs are now
placed in a clade of mammals that
diversified in Africa (the superordinal
clade Afrotheria), which is
phylogenetically distinct from the
clade that diversified in the northern
supercontinent Laurasia, and which
includes ‘true’ hedgehogs (theLaurasiatheria) [1]. Phylogenies
based on gene sequences are often
considered as being less susceptible
to homoplasy — the possession of
similarities that evolved independently
in different lineages — than are trees
based on morphology, and therefore
have the potential to determine
evolutionary relationships in a more
robust and reliable manner.
Convergence of gene and
amino-acid sequences is traditionally
considered to be rare. In this issue of
Current Biology, convergent research
by Li et al. [2] and Liu et al. [3] gives
a stunning insight into how gene and
protein sequences can be subject to
convergent adaptive evolution in
similar ways to morphological
characters. Their studies are based on
prestin, a motor protein found in the
outer hair cells of the inner ear of the
mammalian cochlea. The expression
of prestin correlates with the
appearance of outer hair cell
electromotility, and prestin differs
from classical motors that are driven by
enzymes (that require ATP-hydrolysis)
by converting voltage to force directly.
Consequently, prestin acts several
orders of magnitude more quicklythan cellular motor proteins, and its
contribution to auditory sensitivity in
mammals is immense — a targeted
deletion of prestin showed a >100-fold
(or 40 dB) loss of auditory sensitivity in
mice [4,5].
A sensory system that places
extreme demands on audition
is echolocation. Echolocation
involves producing sound — typically,
ultrasound frequencies of >20 kHz —
and then receiving and analysing
echoes that return from objects.
Echolocation has attained its greatest
sophistication in bats and toothed
whales such as dolphins and porpoises
where it is used for orientation and
often to detect, localise and classify
prey [6]. Echolocating animals are
complex phenotypically, and show
many adaptive specialisations
associated with sound production
and hearing. Prestin is unique to
mammals, and its evolution
resulted from positive selection
acting on orthologues (solute carrier
anion-transport family proteins) since
mammals split from a common
ancestor with birds [7].
Prestin was believed to be under
strong purifying selection and hence
became conserved in mammals [7],
but recent evidence shows it to have
undergone further positive selection
in bat species that use specialized
constant-frequency echolocation
(CF bats), and which have associated
sharp tuning in their auditory systems
[8]. Moreover, bats that produce
echolocation calls in the larynx
(laryngeal echolocators) form
amonophyletic group in a phylogenetic
